Falling Rocks and Rising Risks in New Lands of Law by Traynor, Roger J.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1977 | Issue 3 Article 1
9-1-1977
Falling Rocks and Rising Risks in New Lands of
Law
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law and Society Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Falling Rocks and Rising Risks in New Lands of Law, 1977 BYU L. Rev. 535 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1977/iss3/1
Falling Rocks and Rising Risks in New Lands of 
Law? 
Roger J. Traynor* 
Five years ago, on the road to an old mountain town, I ob- 
served that the age-old risks of falling rocks continued to haunt 
new roads, and that the risks had grown commensurate with con- 
struction and traffic. No miracle of engineering was ever a safety 
match for the perpetual motion of the earth and its people. 
A comparable observation could be made of law. True, we 
have dislodged many dangerously situated rocks such as obsoles- 
cent or confusing precedents that were once perched to fall on 
some hapless passerby. New outcroppings have appeared, how- 
ever, signifying the risks that attend our development of new 
areas of law. Like good mountaineers, we must take our bearings 
anew, the better to keep on a rational course. 
In doing so, we are bound to accept, and to utilize as best we 
can, the navigational aids of the time and place, the late twen- 
tieth century in an economy increasingly devoted to services as 
well as products, functioning under the traditions of the common 
law and multifarious statutes as well. 
If the greatest modern change in the law is the shift in em- 
phasis from property to people, the greatest change in lawmaking 
is the shift in predominance from courts to legislatures. The 
guideposts along the mountainous paths of the law were once 
mainly the marking tablets of courts. The engraving was a slow 
and often inefficient process; the lettering bore old-fashioned dips 
and curves. The guideposts nonetheless were majestic enough to 
command attention, even when any resemblance between their 
dictates and a changing scene around them had become strictly 
incidental. Even when they no longer made much sense, even 
when narrow logic had overtones of lunacy, and dull readings of 
once bright precedents had undertones of retardation, these 
guideposts evoked a reassuring continuity and stability. They 
are still there, but now they are obscured by formidable poles 
t Based on a speech to the Utah State Bar, Park City, Utah, 8 June 1972. 
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and fences posted with the motley directions of the legislators, 
of Congress and state assemblies and town councils and sundry 
Authorities and Boards. 
It cannot be otherwise. As people and their wants multiply, 
so do laws. We have come a long way from a wilderness where 
those who sighted the signs of unoccupied property shrewdly built 
fortunes on adverse possession. Such a concept of the common 
law, once admirably designed to encourage active use of the land, 
has lost much of its applicability now that most of us live in the 
glass houses of cities. Statutes proliferate to spell out permis-sible 
or prohibited uses of property in relation to the community. A 
man's property is no longer his domain to rule as he pleases so 
long as he makes at least token use of it. Moreover, despite his 
increasing prosperity in terms of well-being and longevity, he is 
himself less a free agent than ever in relation to a state that busily 
prescribes traffic rules for his procession from the cradle to the 
grave. 
It may be less a paradox than a symptom of the expanding 
dimensions of our lives that along with new constraints upon us, 
we also enjoy greater protection than ever of basic freedoms. The 
state has become a formidable omnipresence that, with judicial 
prodding, never ceases to read us our rights. Two major risks in 
our new lands of law ensue, each threatening the delicate balance 
between the individual and the state, a balance as essential as 
any in ecology. The first risk is an excess of constraint by the 
state, beyond the inevitable regulation that attends a complex 
economy. The second risk is an abuse of freedom by a small 
number of people at the expense of many others, an abuse that 
ironically opens the way for the state to intervene with more rules. 
Consider first the risk of excessive constraint. For all the 
seeming efficiency of legislative mass production, it can often 
operate irrationally. The very hyperproductivity of legislators in 
their expanding fields of lawmaking exemplifies the riches and 
perils of an age of plenty, its abundance and attendant pollution. 
Too often the branches of spreading bureaus are unwittingly 
working at loggerheads. 
Receptive we may be to new riches in the law, but we cannot 
let them accumulate in such haphazard heaps that they confuse 
the law at the expense of rational reform. Hence, as legislators 
increase their already massive output of statutes, judges must 
correspondingly enlarge their responsibility for keeping the law a 
coherent whole. Now it behooves them to clarify confusing or 
conflicting statutes not merely in the context of precedent, for 
the sake of stability, but also in the context of the expanding 
rights of all people in a democratic society, for the sake of justice. 
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In this modern perspective there is new significance in the old- 
fashioned tablets of the courts. 
The very caution of the judicial process gives some assurance 
that our legal system will not deteriorate into a mindless bureauc- 
racy. The judge is confined by the record in the case, which in 
turn is confined to legally relevant material, limited by eviden- 
tiary rules. So it happens that even a decision of far-reaching 
importance still concludes with the words: "We hold today only 
that . . . . We do not reach the question whether . . . ." Cir- 
cumspectly the engraver of guidepost stops, so as not to confuse 
the pattern of transition from yesterday to today. The guideposts 
enable the wanderer to find his way from Park City* to Salt Lake 
City or San Francisco; from there he can find his way to the 
moon. Tomorrow is time enough for new guideposts, as the facts 
of tomorrow come due. There is then time enough for reason to 
temper each new day of judgment. 
Fortunately, independent courts in this free country have 
demonstrated that individuals have legal recourse against legisla- 
tive or bureaucratic excesses. The governing Goliaths who would 
hurl boulders to instill fear in the governed have been deterred 
on occasion by well-aimed arrows from the courthouses. 
At the same time, however, courts are open to the risk of 
being misused themselves as ad hoc legislatures. In an age of 
tumult, characterized by scholars as an epochal departure from 
customs and beliefs that once encompassed standards of conduct, 
crafty leaders of assorted causes have come to view the bench as 
a service counter for the dispensation of olympian commands to 
the legislature in the name of liberth, &galit&, fraternith, and mis- 
cellaneous beautiful relationships. A judge grooved in the rock 
beat of current times may also be asked to prescribe a pattern for 
urban or interurban transportation, to render a directive to the 
legislature on a redistribution of income via the tax laws, or to 
incorporate into a judicial pronouncement on the zoning of 
marshlands whatever declaration of foreign policy on continental 
shelves has been advanced by some ambitious town council. 
There are also regularly requests for a kindly judicial pronounce- 
ment on the right of an individual to do as he or she pleases, free 
of such chilling considerations as the rights of other individuals. 
Freedom, in the view of many special pleaders, is not the harmo- 
nizing of many individual interests within a variegated society, 
but the supremacy of the capital I against a lower-case world. 
* The author is a native of Park City, Utah. 
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As one who has declared himself against the perpetuation of 
shibboleths that no longer relate to the facts of life, if they ever 
did, I should like now to add a cautionary postscript against 
punch lines from the bench to embellish social-planning briefs for 
the millenium or to brighten librettos about the I, as in Idiopathy. 
The zealots of law reform or individual freedom too often are as 
indifferent to exacting standards of quality control as the me- 
chanics of the status quo. Today there are cynics among the zeal- 
ots who would debase the judicial process into a free-for-all 
forum. When they are restrained from setting up their soapboxes 
in the courtroom, they freely hurl their diatribes against such 
restraints within shouting distance, at times on the very steps of 
the courthouse. 
Those who abuse their unparalleled freedom in this country 
create risks as threatening as those created by irresponsible law- 
makers in our new lands of law. Hence it may be timely to bear 
witness, from my own life as a judge, to the traditional openness 
and fairness of our judicial procedures, which are crucial to jus- 
tice. Foreign visitors to our courts never cease to be amazed at a 
legal system that affords such meticulous protection to the very 
demagogues who denounce it. That irony is compounded when 
bullies not only exploit good causes to give a gloss of credibility 
to irresponsible lies, but also intimidate normally reasonable peo- 
ple into echoing the lies. I honor the traditions of my sturdy 
country that encompass a tolerance for irresponsible statements 
as a price to be willingly paid for an open society. Given that 
openness, I mince no words in stating my own view that it is 
irresponsible for anyone to echo such demagogic assertions as the 
proposition that one group or another in this country cannot get 
a fair trial, when he is well aware that no country in the world 
has done more to insure fair trials. They confess cravenness who 
rationalize such statements as no more than strategic amens to 
placate rabble-rousers, a pouring of oil on troubled waters. The 
consequences of pouring oil on troubled waters are as lamentable 
for society as for the ecology. The addicts of fashion who would 
not be caught dead with anything but the latest cause should at 
least be challenged when they parrot the nonsense of wizened 
gurus and denounce as political trials any judicial procedures for 
resolving open questions on common garden varieties of crime. 
The unholy combination of bullies and the cowards who pla- 
cate them is particularly sinister because their theatrics, purport- 
edly on behalf of striking down one alleged injustice or another, 
in the end threatens the freedom and justice that so many of us 
still take for granted. Consider the consequences, for example, of 
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the tendency to equate the most cynical or brutal lawbreaker with 
Antigone. Both have broken the law, we are told, for a higher law. 
I have no quarrel with Antigone, who made a fairly persuasive 
case for giving her brother decent burial in defiance of an arbi- 
trary order issued by Creon that was itself a violation of estab- 
lished custom. I cannot yet be bullied into believing, however, 
that terrorists are on the same high plane of lawbreaking when 
they hijack a plane, or bomb a building in which people are 
working, or stone at  random, in the name of social justice, the 
windows of shopkeepers who are hardly the proximate cause of 
social injustice. The Greeks have a word for such guerrillas, but 
it is not Antigone. 
A significant element in the heroism of Antigone distin- 
guishes her from either the publicity-seeking street actors who 
build up every scene along their way or the anonymous alley cats 
who destroy everything in their path. There was nothing in her 
defiance of the state that wreaked injury on innocent people. She 
would not have understood the cynicism and brutality of the 
bullies who ride good causes. 
It should hardly be necessary to explain that my own decla- 
ration against such bullies is not to be interpreted as a declaration 
against the good causes that they sometimes exploit. So confused 
has communication become, however, amid the cynical cater- 
wauls of self-styled public saviors, that it has come to prove nec- 
essary even amid seemingly rational groups to supplement any 
critique of the caterwaulers with an oath that I am not now, nor 
have I ever been, a warmonger or an imperialist or a racist. In- 
deed, why should I be when people all over the world, and of every 
conceivable group, bear such startling resemblance to one an- 
other in their occasional saintliness, their recurring villainy, and 
their perennially bumbling humanity? 
This ritual over, there may be need of still another, a state- 
ment of why I think the time has come to focus on today's social 
problems without an endless recounting of the sins of the fathers, 
grandfathers, and distant kin. Since there is not a person alive, 
from Alaska to Zambia, whose ancestors were all paragons of 
virtue, the game of mea culpa can be played all the way back to 
original sin, but it is a great waste of time when there is so much 
real work to be done. Moreover, there have been enough impres- 
sive gains in social justice in recent years to give hope of many 
more, despite the woe-cryers. Among many people, there is a t  
least a will for consensus rather than conflict on the salient inter- 
locking issues of the day. There is a new yearning for moral values 
to give meaning to material gains. There is even a chance that 
540 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
we may be able to turn to good social purpose the interest in 
participatory democracy, once it has emerged from its kicking 
and screaming infancy. 
There is some ground for hope that the growing participation 
of the young, not only in political life but also in groups such as 
bar associations, will at least invigorate the democratic process. 
What an army it would be, young lawyers across the country 
armed with pens, who could do battle against such basic ills of 
the democratic process as the chilling costs of elections, the fever- 
ish pace of campaigns, and the delusions of grandeur of occa- 
sional newcomers in legislative halls who use them as bases of 
power for disrupting a democratic society. There could be a con- 
tinuing review of bureaucracy in action, of the excess fat of cer- 
tain bureaus and the anemia of others. There could be intensive 
critiques of government budgets. Never have there been more 
challenges to lawyers, or more high roads open to them along 
which they can confront those challenges peacefully and effec- 
tively. It is for them to take the lead against the mongers of 
confusion and fear, the ugly substitutes for law and freedom, and 
to reason why every inch of the way. 
We can concede real grievances: widespread delays in courts, 
antiquated procedures in some states, and the plague of politics 
in others. Such grievances could be readily remedied whenever 
bar associations and judicial councils impelled legislatures to set 
reform in motion. There would be need of only one help more, the 
sustained support of editors and reporters responsible enough to 
forego pudding headlines for the hard job of sorting out signifi- 
cant from inconsequential details and assembling them in reada- 
ble form. If they did that job, they would find readers. With 
writing and reading once again in season, would there not be a 
new age of reason? 
More than ever, we must count on the men and women of the 
law, not only to develop new ground but also to minimize the 
attendant risks for others. Most of all, we must count on the sense 
of balance that reasonable lawyers can bring to a society seeking 
to reconcile inevitable government regulation with essential indi- 
vidual freedom. In the West that sense of equilibrium is fostered 
by the still vivid history of the trek across the wilderness. That 
heroic trek, sometimes depending on how alertly one balanced the 
handcart that carried all the belongings for the makings of a new 
home, has set an example for the perilous expeditions we now 
confront along the traffic-clogged roads to new lands of law. 
